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DECREASING DIRTY DUMPING? A REEVALUATION OF
TOXIC WASTE COLONIALISM AND THE GLOBAL
MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY HAZARDOUS
WASTE
LAURA A. W. PRATT*
ABSTRACT
Even though the phrase “toxic waste colonialism” has fallen out
of usage in the past ten years, the effective global management of trans-
boundary hazardous waste has yet to become an out-of-date topic. Starting
in the early 1980s, the international community sought to develop inter-
national agreements governing the transboundary movement of hazardous
waste in order to protect developing countries from illegal “dirty dumping”
practices. Over twenty years have passed since the adoption of the Basel
Convention formed the foundation for other subsequent global protocols.
However, the ever-increasing global quantities of hazardous waste, includ-
ing the growing electronic waste issue, only exacerbate the disproportionate
risks faced by developing countries in current efforts of implementation
and policy of global hazardous waste management. The persistence of
these issues indicates that the transboundary movement of hazardous
waste and the international methods introduced to correct these problems
are ripe for reevaluation. Hopefully, by considering the loopholes in the
current international system and suggesting possible recommendations
for future global agreements, this area of international law can be more
effectively addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, over five hundred tons of a mixture of fuel, caustic soda,
and hydrogen sulfide was distributed to twelve different sites around the
largest city in Côte d’Ivoire, Abidjan.1 Now referred to as the Côte d’Ivoire
1 See Adam Duckett, Trafigura Story Breaks, THE CHEMICAL ENGINEER (Oct. 13, 2009),
http://www.tcetoday.com/tcetoday/NewsDetail.aspx?nid=12188.
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toxic waste dump,2 this affair became a major health crisis and a harsh
reminder of the breakdowns in the global management of hazardous
waste. The events leading up to the toxic waste dump actually began four
years prior and involved many different countries. In 2002, a Mexican
state-owned oil company, Pemex, began to accumulate large amounts of
coker gasoline containing both sulfur and silica at its Cadereyta refinery.3
When the refinery reached its full storage capacity in early 2006, it sold the
material to the Swiss-based, multi-national, oil and commodity shipping
company, Trafigura Beheer BV, which loaded the material onto a Pana-
manian registered tanker, Probo Koala, located in the port of Brownsville,
Texas, and owned by a Greek shipping company.4 After the caustic wash-
ing of the coker gasoline was completed on board the tanker, Trafigura
sought a disposal site for the residual hazardous waste.5 Rather than pay
the disposal charge offered by a company in Amsterdam and several other
countries, the material was offloaded at the Port of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.6
The material caused severe harm to human health; twelve people were
confirmed to have died from exposure to the waste’s byproducts, and at
least 30,000 were injured.7 Presently, it seems that, at least legally and
2 See, e.g., Cote d’Ivoire Toxic Waste Dump Victims Reflect on “Small Victory,” AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/côte
-d’ivoire-toxic-waste-dump-victims-reflect-quotsmall-victoryquot-20091110.
3 Duckett, supra note 1.
4 Id. Trafigura desired to strip the sulfurous products out of the coker gasoline to produce
naphtha which could then be sold; to cut down on refinery costs, Trafigura used an experi-
mental process onboard the ship called “caustic washing” in which the coker was treated
with caustic soda. See id. The process worked, and the resulting naphtha was resold for
a reported profit of $19 million. See id. The waste resulting from the caustic washing
would typically include highly dangerous substances such as sodium hydroxide, sodium
sulphide and phenols. See id.
5 Philippe Bernard, Jacques Follorou & Jean-Pierre Stroobants, How Abidjan Became a
Dump, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (October 20, 2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/20
/outlook.development.
6 Id. The material was then spread around the city and surrounding areas, dumped in
waste grounds, public dumps, and even along roads in populated areas. See Duckett, supra
note 1. As there are two sides to every story, Trafigura denied that any toxic waste was
transported and that the material contained only tiny amounts of the toxic hydrogen sul-
fide. See Bernard et al., supra note 5. Trafigura also claimed that this exchange was per-
formed under an agreement that guaranteed the proper treatment and disposal of the
material. See id.
7 David Leigh, How UK Oil Company Trafigura Tried to Cover Up African Pollution
Disaster, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Sept. 16, 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world
/2009/sep/16/trafigura-oil-ivory-coast; see also Ivory Coast Poisoning Scandal Death Toll
Jumps to 10, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://www.reliefweb.int
/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/KHII-6UM7M9?OpenDocument&rc=1&emid=AC-2006-000134-CIV.
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politically, the civil actions of this health crisis are finally drawing to a
close; as of October 2009, Trafigura had paid $198 million to the Ivorian
government for clean-up costs and made a £30 million offer to the injured
citizens.8 Unfortunately, the people of Abidjan may continue to feel the
effects of the crisis long after other issues are resolved.
The Côte d’Ivoire toxic waste dump serves as a harsh reminder that
toxic waste colonialism, where underdeveloped states are used as inexpen-
sive alternatives for the export or disposal of hazardous waste pollution
by developed states,9 still poses an interesting problem for the successful
global management of transboundary hazardous waste. Even though it is
in clear violation of the United Nations’ Stockholm Declaration, the export
of hazardous waste to nations with less stringent environmental standards
is not an uncommon event.10 In the early 1980s, illegal dumping, such as
what occurred in Abidjan, was the most common form of transboundary
hazardous waste exchange.11 To protect developing countries from such
“dirty dumping” practices, the international community sought to develop
international agreements governing the transboundary movement of haz-
ardous waste.12 The main international agreement in this area, the Basel
Convention on the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal,13 was adopted in 1989 and has served as the foundation for
8 Peter Murphy, Trafigura to Pay $198 Million Settlement to Ivory Coast, REUTERS (Feb. 13,
2007), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1333815220070213; David Leigh,
Greenpeace Continues Trafigura Pursuit Over Toxic Waste, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2009),
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/20/greenpeace-trafigura-toxic-waste.
Despite these settlements, “Greenpeace wants Trafigura prosecuted for manslaughter
and grievous bodily harm, citing documents it says demonstrate the waste’s high toxicity.
Trafigura also faces a Dutch prosecution for allegedly lying about the true nature of its
waste.” Id.
9 Tam Dalyell, Thistle Diary: Toxic Wastes and Other Ethical Issues, NEW SCIENTIST, July 2,
1992, at 50. See also Zada Lipman, A Dirty Dilemma: The Hazardous Waste Trade, HARV.
INT’L REV., Winter 2002, at 67, 71.
10 See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Sweden,
June 5–16, 1972, Declaration on the Human Environment, § II, princ. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration] (stating that “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law . . . the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”).
11 See Jennifer R. Kitt, Note, Waste Exports to the Developing World: A Global Response,
7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 485, 486–88 & 493–94 (1995).
12 Id. at 486.
13 The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste
and Their Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126, 28 I.L.M. 649
(4 U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG. 8013) [hereinafter Basel Convention].
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subsequent global protocols.14 However, it has now been twenty years since
the Basel Convention first addressed the issue of transboundary hazard-
ous waste.15 Even though the illegal dumping numbers have decreased
in the last few years,16 as the growing electronic waste issues and isolated
events such as the Côte d’Ivoire toxic waste dump illustrate,17 the problem
of disproportionate risks faced by developing countries still persists in
the current efforts of implementation and the policies of global hazardous
waste management. The problems associated with toxic waste colonialism
seem to indicate that the transboundary movement of hazardous waste
and the international methods introduced to correct these problems are
ripe for reevaluation.
This reevaluation of the global management of hazardous waste
must include not only a history of the transboundary movement of haz-
ardous waste and past regulatory schemes, but also a discussion of the
loopholes in the current system and possible recommendations for a new
system. The first section of this article will discuss an overview of toxic
waste colonialism.18 Crucial to understanding this issue is its underlying
causes, and this first section will specifically address why developing coun-
tries face disproportionate risks in regards to the management of hazardous
waste. The next section will discuss the development of the global man-
agement of hazardous waste.19 The international response to the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous waste has interesting beginnings, which
laid the foundation for the Basel Convention.20 The Basel Convention is
considered the most far-reaching international agreement, establishing
a global notification and consent system for the transboundary movement
of hazardous waste and prohibiting the trade of covered wastes.21 Follow-
ing the Basel Convention, there were many forms of early implementa-
tion schemes and amendments which have been the focus of most of the
14 Kitt, supra note 11, at 493, 500–01.
15 Id. at 493.
16 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL TRAFFICKING AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA: A THREAT ASSESSMENT 56 (July 2009).
17 Press Release, United Nations Environment Programme, Urgent Need to Prepare
Developing Countries for Surge in E-Wastes (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://www
.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=612&ArticleID=6471&l=
en&t=long; Duckett, supra note 1.
18 See discussion infra Part I.
19 See discussion infra Part II.
20 See discussion infra Part II.A.
21 See David P. Hackett, An Assessment of the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 5 AM. U. J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 291, 291–294, 312 (1990).
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controversies in this area.22 These developments provide a good background
for this reevaluation. The final section will reevaluate the current system
for the global management of hazardous waste, focusing on the possible
issues with the current system.23 Because toxic waste colonialism is still a
present threat to developing countries, this section will include some rec-
ommendations, focusing on the implementation and policy of future inter-
national responses in order to increase the effectiveness of the actions.
I. TOXIC WASTE COLONIALISM OVERVIEW24
The Côte d’Ivoire toxic waste dump represents a surprisingly per-
sistent global trend where underdeveloped states are used as disposal sites
for waste rejected by developed states.25 “Toxic colonialism” was the term
of art created to label this activity and bring international attention to the
disproportionate risks faced by developing countries in this area of inter-
national environmental law.26 However, the name does not begin to illus-
trate all the problems associated with the transboundary movement of
hazardous waste to developing countries. Because of many overlapping
causes, developing countries have been targeted as hazardous waste dis-
posal sites before the 1980s, after which the dumping activities finally gar-
nered international legal action.27 These causes have actually perpetuated
and aggravated issues associated with toxic waste colonialism and are an
important foundation to the reevaluation of the current international
regulatory scheme.
22 See discussion infra Part II.B–C.
23 See discussion infra Part III.
24 Toxic waste colonialism has also been known as “the silent trade,” Mey Jurdi, Trans-
boundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes Into Lebanon: Part 1. The Silent Trade, J. ENVTL.
HEALTH, Jan.–Feb. 2002 at 9, 10, “toxic colonialism,” Dalyell, supra note 9, or “dirty
dumping,” Basel Action Network, BAN Statement at the Global E-Waste Forum (Dec. 1,
2006), available at http://www.ban.org/cop8/061201_ban_statement.html.
25 Kitt, supra note 11, at 485, 487–91.
26 Dalyell, supra note 9.
27 Lipman, supra note 9, at 67–68. Lipman describes several other cases of toxic waste
colonialism. In 1987, several thousand tons of toxic and radioactive wastes were exported
from Italy to Koko, Nigeria, and stored in drums in a backyard. Id., at 67. In 1988, Guinea-
Bissau was offered a $600 million contract to dispose of 15 million tons of toxic waste over
five years, and, even though this contract was never carried out, similar arrangements
were reported in other developing countries such as Namibia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and
Haiti. Id.
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A. What’s in a Name?
“Toxic colonialism” was a phrase originally coined by Jim Puckett
of Greenpeace, describing the “dumping of the industrial wastes of the
West on territories of the Third World.”28 Global inequality or injustice in
this area has its roots in “the production and consumption patterns” of
the developed world.29 Even though historical colonialism focused on the
political and legal domination over an alien society, some of the charac-
teristics of colonialism involving economic dependence, exploitation, and
cultural inequality are intimately associated within the new realm of toxic
waste colonialism.30 While the phrase “toxic waste colonialism” represents
these essential concerns regarding disproportionate risks between nation
states, the phrase does not begin to articulate all the underlying risks
associated with this activity.
The opportunity for human exposure in a developing nation is
much greater than in a developed nation.31 The transboundary movement
of hazardous waste is usually meant to either seek out disposal sites or
achieve “resource recovery, recycling, or reuse.”32 Unfortunately, many
developing countries lack the technology, “training, funding, and admin-
istrative infrastructure” to properly carry out these tasks.33 Without the
capacity to properly handle the waste, it simply is dumped in piles, either
in public areas as in Abidjan or in other areas barely qualifying as land-
fills.34 In either case, the waste results in environmental impact or human
exposure.35 As expected, even if humans do not directly handle the hazard-
ous waste, improper disposal can create secondary environmental prob-
lems, such as noxious fumes or groundwater contamination, which only
28 Dalyell, supra note 9. Jim Puckett is presently one of the coordinators of BAN (Basel
Action Network) and still advocating to prevent the globalization of the toxic chemical
crisis. See About the Basel Action Network, BASEL ACTION NETWORK, http://ban.org/main
/about_BAN.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
29 DAVID NAGUIB PELLOW, RESISTING GLOBAL TOXICS: TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 32 (Robert Gottlieb ed., 2007).
30 See Colonialism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 9, 2006), http://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/colonialism/.
31 Kitt, supra note 11, at 486.
32 Lipman, supra note 9, at 67.
33 Kitt, supra note 11, at 486.
34 Id. at 486, 492.
35 Id. at 486; see also JORGE E. HARDOY, DIANA MITLIN, & DAVID SATTERTHWAITE,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES 68 (1992) (discussing how many
people in third world countries simply rummage through landfills filled with hazardous
waste for anything useful or sellable, increasing the likelihood for detrimental exposure).
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exasperate human exposure concerns and increase the negative effects
on human health.36
Furthermore, the lack of funding and resources in these developing
nations can create other issues that are not faced by developed nations.
Many of the governments of these nations simply do not have the resources
to treat human victims and to clean up environmental contamination after
hazardous waste has been received and later results in a toxic disaster.37
A report issued by the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment articulated that “exporting waste results in potential risks primarily
to people in importing countries, who do not share in the benefits of the
waste generating production processes.”38 In other words, these develop-
ing countries disproportionately carry the extreme costs to human health
and environmental concerns without benefitting from the profits made by
producing nations.
B. Causes
The increase of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste
and the persistence of toxic waste colonialism in modern society have sev-
eral causes, most of which are traced to the global increase of hazardous
waste production and various economic pressures.
1. Global Increase of Hazardous Waste Production
Developed nations inevitably produce more hazardous substances,
due in large part to the development process itself, which involves heavy
industrialization in order to achieve capitalistic economic progress.39 Al-
though completely accurate quantities are hard to measure, the worldwide
generation of hazardous waste in 1945 was estimated to be five million
36 See Kitt, supra note 11, at 491–92. Kitt includes the natural environment and climate of
many developing nations as another exasperating cause of negative effects, using the heavy
sub-Saharan African rainfall, which causes landfill waste to leach into the groundwater
much more quickly as an example. See id. at 491.
37 See Bogonko Bosire, UN Seeks Help to Clean up Ivorian Toxic Waste Dumps, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE (Nov. 23, 2006), available at http://www.terradaily.com/reports/UN_Seeks
_Help_To_Clean_Up_Deadly_Ivorian_Toxic_Waste_Dumps_999.html (discussing how it
was unfair for one of the world’s most impoverished nations to pay the cleanup costs of the
Ivorian toxic waste dumps) [hereinafter Ivorian Toxic Waste Dumps].
38 WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 35 (Oxford University Press
1987); see also Kitt, supra note 11, at 492–93.
39 See PELLOW, supra note 29, at 99–101.
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metric tons, and it had increased to an estimated four-hundred million
metric tons in 2000.40 At least three-fourths of this amount is generated in
industrialized, developed nations.41 The quantity of waste is not expected
to decrease either. It is estimated that by 2020, the total production of haz-
ardous waste in the developed world will have increased by sixty percent
to 194 million tons annually.42 Unfortunately, this ever-growing category
of waste contains a wide range of substances, including such things as
contaminated medical waste, industrial sludge, radioactive materials, old
ships, electronic wastes, incinerator ash, and military equipment.43 It is
estimated that only four percent of the generated quantities of hazardous
waste actually travel across international borders;44 some scholars even
suggest that most of this transboundary quantity is exchanged between
developed countries.45 However, most statistics on the transboundary move-
ment of hazardous waste from developed countries to developing countries
are based primarily on legal transfers, and the quantification of illegal
transboundary exchanges of hazardous wastes is much more difficult.46
Even though the exact number of fraudulent or illegal shipping cases re-
mains unknown, the fact that hazardous waste quantities are continually
increasing makes toxic waste colonialism an attractive disposal option even
for legal transactions.47 Interestingly enough, the reaction of citizens in de-
veloped countries to hazardous waste disposal facilities often perpetuates
40 DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 947 (3rd ed. 2007).
41 Id.
42 See PELLOW, supra note 29, at 33.
43 Lisa Mastny & Hilary French, Crimes of (a) Global Nature: Forging Environmental
Treaties is Difficult. Enforcing Them is Even Tougher., WORLD WATCH, Sept.–Oct. 2002,
at 12, available at http://www.worldwatch.org/node/523. All of these materials have been
disposed of in a developing country; many have been the cause of illegal dumping affairs.
It is worth noting that shipments of hazardous electronic waste or “e-waste” is a growing
trend and will probably need to be addressed in its own legislation due to the growing
volume of those materials. See Stephanie Condon, Congress Tackles E-Waste in the House
and Nationally, CNET (Feb. 11, 2009, 4:45 PM PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3
-10162214-38.html.
44 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 947. But see Mark A. Montgomery, Banning Waste
Exports: Much Ado About Nothing, 1 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 197, 200–01 (1994) (stating inter-
national hazardous waste transfer is less than one half of 1% but acknowledging the data
reflects only legal transfers).
45 Montgomery, supra note 44, at 200.
46 See id. at 201–02 (indicating that most United Nations Environmental Programme
(“UNEP”) data compilations rely upon numbers provided by Greenpeace, which sometimes
bases estimates on proposals for waste disposal rather than the actual waste shipments).
47 Id. at 201; PELLOW, supra note 29, at 33.
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the desire to ship waste outside a developed nation as an “out of sight,
out of mind” alternative.48
2. Economic Pressures
Money is the key motivating factor for toxic waste colonialism;
“[developed countries] want to save it, and [developing countries] want
to earn it.”49 Developed countries generally have increasingly stringent
environmental regulations governing the domestic disposal of hazardous
wastes.50 When compliance costs are coupled with an increased quantity
of waste and local opposition to disposal, they generally produce drastically
increased disposal costs for hazardous waste.51 In contrast, developing
countries lack both the strict regulations and enforcement schemes of the
developed world, causing a great disparity in the costs of disposal.52 Cheap
land and labor for landfill operations in these developing countries make
hazardous waste exports a cost-effective option for hazardous waste pro-
ducers in developed countries.
Furthermore, the wealth and income gaps between developing
nations and developed nations have continually grown throughout the
past century.53 As developing nations seek to boost economic growth, the
enforcement of the few hazardous waste regulations in place often fall by
the wayside.54 Many agencies in these developing countries do not have
the resources to give approvals or enforce their regulations, so illegal
48 PELLOW, supra note 29, at 33; see also Kitt, supra note 11, at 490. Kitt calls this the
“NIMBY” phenomena, describing the “not in my backyard” mentality of many residents
of the developed world. Id.
49 Kitt, supra note 11, at 485.
50 Id. at 487–88.
51 See Ron Chepesiuk, How the West is Dumping on the Third World: The Toxic Trade
Nightmare, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., July 8, 1990, at G1, available at http://articles
.orlandosentinel.com/1990-07-08/news/9007060921_1_toxic-waste-radioactive-wastes-tons
-of-waste. It is estimated that hazardous waste may cost as much as $3000 per ton of
material in a developed nation. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 948.
52 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 948; see also Chepesiuk, supra note 51 (noting that
disposal costs in Africa can be as low as $40 per ton).
53 PELLOW, supra note 29, at 42; see also J. Timmons Roberts & Peter E. Grimes, World-
System Theory and the Environment, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS, CONTEMPORARY INSIGHTS 177 (Riley Dunlap et al. eds., 2002).
54 See, e.g., Gonzalo Biggs, Latin America & The Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes,
5 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 333, 340–42 (1994) (describing how Latin America’s debt
crisis in the 1980s required countries to focus on economic growth, causing many natural
resources to be exploited and environmental agencies to be eliminated because environ-
mental management was not a priority when the nations were in poverty).
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transactions become a quick-fix alternative solution.55 This lack of agency
resources can also cause higher quantities or more types of toxic substances
to be accepted than the country can actually handle.56 Many of these coun-
tries face large debts and require hard currency to service these debts and
boost their economies.57 With the collapse of domestic environmental en-
forcement schemes, hazardous waste disposal contracts that promise large
amounts of foreign currency are hard to refuse.58 This opens the door for
fraudulent or illegal dumping transactions in which developing nations
are tricked into accepting mislabeled or improperly classified hazardous
waste.59 Even if developing countries are informed of all the dangers asso-
ciated with a waste, they usually do not have the necessary knowledge to
ascertain all costs of disposal, including the long-term effects or damage to
the environment.60 When a large, cash-on-delivery payment is presented,
these costs are often overlooked for the short-term gain.61
The increased trade in recyclable or reusable hazardous waste has
exacerbated the other economic causes of toxic waste colonialism.62 Recy-
clable materials are “wastes that contain valuable precious metals or other
residues that can be reprocessed to generate raw materials.”63 Environ-
mentally sound methods of recycling and reclamation can reduce the need
to exploit other natural resources and hold tremendous potential, but most
developing countries lack the capacity to properly treat these materials.64
Unfortunately, the industrial and economic potential of recycling and rec-
lamation has led to a growing trend of sham recycling operations, where,
despite the label assigned to the operations, the receiving company, usually
in a developing country, does not properly handle the exported hazardous
waste.65 Legitimate, law-abiding recycling or reclamation facilities are often
55 Kitt, supra note 11, at 492.
56 See id.
57 Id. at 490; see also Anup Shah, Third World Debt Undermines Development, GLOBAL
ISSUES, http://www.globalissues.org/print/issue/28 (last updated June 3, 2007).
58 See Mary Critharis, Third World Nations are Down in the Dumps: The Export of
Hazardous Waste, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 311, 315 (1990); see also Kitt, supra note 11, at 490
(describing the proposed Guinea-Bissau hazardous waste contract which promised an in-
come equivalent to four times the country’s gross national product or twice its national debt).
59 See Kitt, supra note 11, at 490–91; see also Montgomery, supra note 44, at 203–04.
60 Kitt, supra note 11, at 491.
61 See id. (“Developing countries may assess costs and risks differently than wealthy coun-
tries would because of their need to provide food, shelter, water and services to their citizens.
Environmental risks may not seem as immediate as housing and disease prevention . . . .”).
62 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 947.
63 Id.
64 See Lipman, supra note 9, at 69.
65 See Mastny & French, supra note 43.
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overlooked because the illegal methods of disposal are cheaper or more
prevalent in developing countries.66 Complicated by the increased global
production of hazardous waste and economic pressures, toxic waste colo-
nialism has foundational causes that cannot be overlooked and continue
to be persistent problems in the global management of hazardous waste.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF
TRANSBOUNDARY HAZARDOUS WASTE
Attempts to globally manage the transboundary movement of haz-
ardous waste have spanned almost thirty years.67 Domestic environmental
laws regulating hazardous waste disposal began to appear in the 1970s,
and backed by Principles 2168 and 2269 articulated in the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration, problems associated with toxic waste colonialism began to
gain international attention in the 1980s. Early international agreements
were primarily ad hoc and considered “soft law,”70 but these agreements
continued to bolster awareness of the toxic waste colonialism issue, which
finally culminated in the Basel Convention in 1989. The Basel Convention
was entered into action in 1992 and is still considered the primary inter-
national agreement for regulating the transboundary movement of hazard-
ous waste.71 Even though it is arguably designed more like a trade treaty,
the Basel Convention represents a global recognition of the hazardous
waste problem and provides a foundation for future solutions.72 The Basel
Convention has not been the final international agreement in this area; it
has been followed by several implementation agreements and amendments,
which have further shaped the present state of the global management
of hazardous waste.73
A. Background to Basel
Foundations for the Basel Convention actually began almost fifteen
years prior to the conference. The United States began regulating domestic
66 See Kitt, supra note 11, at 488.
67 See id. at 493–94.
68 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 10, § II, princ. 21.
69 Id. at § II, princ. 22. Principle 22 calls for cooperation between States in the development
of international law for the compensation of victims of environmental damage caused by
activities within one State to areas outside that State’s jurisdiction. Id.
70 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 950; see also Critharis, supra note 58, at 321–23.
71 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 952, 954.
72 See id. at 946–52.
73 See id. at 962–64.
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movements of hazardous waste in 1976 with the passage of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), designed specifically to regulate
the “collection, transport, separation, recovery, and disposal practices and
systems” of hazardous waste.74 While RCRA does exempt certain wastes
such as scrap metals or household waste from regulation,75 its main ob-
jective is to “minimize the present and future threat to human health and
the environment” through its standards.76 In 1984 the export provisions
in RCRA were strengthened, requiring prior informed consent and waste
tracking systems.77 Even though these regulations do not prevent trans-
boundary shipments to countries that may lack capacity and do not directly
address issues with toxic waste colonialism,78 these regulations would later
serve as a model for international considerations, and the United States
was considered a forerunner in these areas.79
Europe also had early legislation dealing with the waste trade. The
European Commission issued Directives in 1975 and 1978 much like RCRA
in order to avoid harm to human health or the environment.80 However,
unlike the United States, these provisions allowed each Member State to
define “hazardous waste” and develop procedures for prior notification; com-
bined with the lack of a firm implementation scheme, the entire process
ended in a complete disaster.81
Even though they were by no means all-inclusive provisions, an
international response to the transboundary movement of hazardous
waste began several years before the Basel Convention. Prior to the Basel
Convention, disastrous incidents resulting from the improper disposal
of hazardous waste in developing countries spawned public recognition
of the need for international control.82 The Organization for Economic
74 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902(a)(8)
(2006); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 950.
75 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(13) & 261.4(b)(1) (2010); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40,
at 950.
76 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b). See also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 950.
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (2006); 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.50–262.58 (2009); HUNTER ET AL., supra
note 40, at 950.
78 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 950.
79 See id. at 950–52.
80 See Council Directive 75/442, 1975 O.J. (L 194) 39 (EC), available at http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31975L0442:EN:HTML; see also Council
Directive 78/319, 1978 O.J. (L 84) 43 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31978L0319:EN:HTML.
81 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 950.
82 Diana L. Godwin, Comment, The Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes: An Opportunity for Industrialized Nations to Clean up Their Acts?,
22 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 193 (1993). Some of these events included the following: an
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Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) responded by issuing several
decisions regarding the movement of hazardous waste; first focusing on
intra-OECD shipments of waste, and later extending the recommendations
to the export of hazardous waste to non-OECD States.83 These decisions
“prohibit[ed] both the export of hazardous waste to non-OECD countries
without prior consent from the receiving country or notice to transit
nations and the export of hazardous waste to non-OECD States that lack
the proper disposal facilities.”84 Unfortunately, the failed implementa-
tion of these recommendations again caused the breakdown of the ideal
regulatory system.85
In 1987 the United Nations Environmental Programme (“UNEP”)
gathered together a group of experts to develop a non-binding agreement
for “environmentally sound management of [h]azardous wastes.”86 The
Cairo Guidelines were designed to address specific concerns regarding the
export of hazardous waste, focusing on principles to regulate the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous waste.87 They were also meant to assist
developing countries in the implementation of appropriate disposal systems
for the treatment of hazardous waste.88 Even though these guidelines and
explosion at a chemical plant near Seveso, Italy, which caused a large, toxic vapor cloud
to be released into the atmosphere in 1976; an explosion in Bhopal, India, where toxic gas
escaped from an underground tank at a chemical manufacturing plant in 1984; a dumping
event in which the Khian Sea, a Philadelphia ship, attempted to unload 13,000 tons of
incinerator ash in Haiti and ended up dumping some of the material in an unknown
location. Id. at 194–196.
83 See OECD, Decision and Recommendation of the Council on Transfrontier Movements
of Hazardous Waste, OECD Doc. C(83) 180 (Feb. 13, 1984), 23 I.L.M. 214 (1984) (recom-
mending that countries responsibly manage hazardous waste situated within their borders
to protect both human health and the environment); see also OECD, Council Decision on
Exports of Hazardous Wastes from the OECD Area, OECD Doc. C(86) 64 (June 5, 1986),
25 I.L.M. 1010 (1986) (extending non-binding recommendations for intra-OECD shipments
to those exporting wastes to non-OECD States); see also OECD, 1988 OECD Council
Decision (Revising the Definition of Hazardous Waste), Council Decision on Transfrontier
Movements of Hazardous Wastes, OECD Doc. C(88) 90 (May 27, 1988), 28 I.L.M. 257 (1989).
84 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 951; see supra text accompanying note 83.
85 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 951.
86 United Nations Environment Programme, Rep. of the Governing Council, 14th Sess.,
June 8–19, 1987, U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 25, A/42/25, at annex I, Dec. 14/30
(1987); see also U.N.E.P., Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound
Management of Hazardous Waste, Dec. 14/30, Jun. 17, 1987, reprinted in 1 BASIC
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE IMPORTANT DECLARATIONS
148–56 (Harald Hohmann, ed. 1992).
87 United Nations Environment Programme, Rep. of the Governing Council, supra note
86, at annex I, Dec. 14/30.
88 See id.
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the previous OECD decisions were not considered binding international
law,89 the global concerns sparked a desire to create a more binding agree-
ment, and these previous decisions and agreements served as a foundation
for the Basel Convention negotiations.90
B. The Basel Convention
Using the previous laws, recommendations, and decisions as guide-
lines and after two years of negotiations between 116 countries, a UNEP
conference held in Basel, Switzerland finally compiled a document directly
addressing the transboundary movement of hazardous waste.91 The Basel
Convention was signed by thirty-five countries at the conference92 and was
designed to become effective upon ratification of twenty countries, which
happened on May 5, 1992.93 As of November 2009, almost 170 countries
were party to the Basel Convention, and forty-nine countries had ratified
it.94 In efforts to encourage waste disposal “as close as possible to the gen-
erator of the waste,” the Basel Convention tried to promote transboundary
movements of hazardous wastes only in situations where “it is the best
environmental solution, and . . . disposal [is performed] in an environmen-
tally sound manner.”95 To further these principles, the Basel Convention
established a global system for notification and prior consent, required
Parties to dispose of waste in an environmentally sound manner, and
89 See Sejal Choksi, The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal: 1999 Protocol on Liability and Compensation,
28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 509, 516 (2001).
90 See id.
91 Godwin, supra note 82, at 199. The conference ended on March 22, 1989. Id.
92 Godwin, supra note 82, at 199.
93 Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 25, para. 1; see also Parties to the Basel
Convention, BASEL CONVENTION, http://www.basel.int/ratif/convention.htm (last visited
Oct. 18, 2010). Present signatories to the Basel Convention include Afghanistan, Argentina,
Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Cyprus, Denmark,
Ecuador, El Salvador, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala,
Haiti, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic,
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, United States of America, and Venezuela. Id.
94 See Parties to the Basel Convention, supra note 93. As of September 2010, the United
States, Haiti, and Afghanistan are the only countries who have signed but not ratified
the Basel Convention, and, as such, these countries are not considered Parties to the
Convention. Id.; see also Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 25, para. 2.
95 Kitt, supra note 11, at 494–96.
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prohibited the trade of covered hazardous wastes with non-Parties.96 The
specifics of certain provisions in the Basel Convention are discussed in the
sections that follow.
1. Definitions
Because the Basel Convention applies to the transboundary move-
ments of “hazardous wastes and other wastes” between Parties, the defi-
nitions of these terms become crucial to the proper implementation of the
governing provisions.97 The Basel Convention actually adopts a very broad
definition of hazardous waste, including wastes from particular waste
streams in manufacturing processes or hazardous constituents of materials,
as well as wastes that are considered hazardous under the domestic laws
of the country of export, import, or transit.98 Furthermore, certain “other
wastes” under Annex II, including household wastes or household incin-
erator wastes, are also covered by the Convention.99 Article 2 also defines
“wastes” as those requiring the disposal operations as defined in Annex IV,
which includes recovery and recycling operations.100 Discharged waste
from ship operations and radioactive materials are considered to be the
96 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 4, paras. 1, 2, 5. “Transboundary movement”
is defined in Article 2 of the Convention as:
any movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes from an area under
the national jurisdiction of one State to or through an area under the
national jurisdiction of another State or to or through an area not under
the national jurisdiction of any State, provided at least two States are
involved in the movement.
Id. at art. 2, para. 3.
97 See id. at pmbl. (reciting concerns regarding “hazardous wastes and other wastes”).
98 See id. at art. 1, annex I, annex III. Article I, paragraph 1, states:
[t]he following wastes that are subject to transboundary movement shall
be “hazardous wastes” for the purposes of this Convention: (a) Wastes
that belong to any category contained in Annex I, unless they do not
posses any of the characteristics contained in Annex III; and (b) Wastes
that are not covered under paragraph (a) but are defined as, or are con-
sidered to be, hazardous wastes by the domestic legislation of the Party
of import, export, or transit.
Id.; see also Kitt, supra note 11, at 494–95.
99 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 1, para. 2 (stating “wastes that belong to
any category contained in Annex II that are subject to transboundary movement shall be
‘other wastes’ for the purposes of this Convention”); see also id. at annex II.
100 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 2 (defining “[w]astes” as “substances or
objects which are disposed of or are intended to be disposed of or are required to be disposed
of by the provisions of national law,” and defining “[d]isposal” as “any operation specified
in Annex IV to this Convention.”); see also id. at annex IV.
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subject of other international control systems, so they are not covered by
the Basel Convention.101
2. Basic Obligations
The Basel Convention does not expressly ban the export of hazard-
ous waste to certain countries, but rather it seeks to control these move-
ments through a system of prior informed consent, strict notification, and
tracking requirements.102 Under the basic obligations of the Convention,
exports and imports of hazardous and other wastes to and from non-Parties
to the Convention are generally prohibited.103 Similarly, if a Party adopts
import bans for certain hazardous wastes into their national territory be-
yond the provisions of the Convention, the other Parties are expected to
honor the ban.104 Furthermore, if Parties have reason to believe an exported
or imported hazardous waste will not be disposed of in an “environmen-
tally sound manner,” they are prohibited from making this shipment.105
Generally, the transboundary movement of waste is only authorized when
the exporting country does not have the capacity to dispose of the mate-
rial “in an environmentally sound and efficient manner” or the waste is
required in the importing county as a raw material or for recycling or
recovery.106 These provisions are designed to encourage the proximity
principle: the disposal of wastes should occur as close to the generator as
possible.107 Along these same lines, all Parties are required to manage
and dispose of waste within their own territories in an environmentally
sound manner by implementing national control systems and adopting
101 Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 1 paras. 3–4. Radioactive wastes are controlled
by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pillars of Nuclear Cooperation, IAEA.ORG,
www.iaea.org/OurWork/SS/index.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). Ocean dumping is
covered by the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste
and Other Matter, art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26.2 U.S.T. 2403, 1046
U.N.T.S. 120.
102 See Lipman, supra note 9, at 68. A total ban is in place for the shipment of waste to
Antarctica under the Basel Convention, which specifies, “[t]he Parties agree not to allow
the export of hazardous wastes or other wastes for disposal within the area south of 60°
South latitude, whether or not such wastes are subject to transboundary movement.” Basel
Convention, supra note 13, at art. 4, para. 6.
103 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, art. 4, para. 5.
104 See id. at art. 4, paras. 1–2.
105 Id. at art. 4, paras. 2, 8.
106 Id. at art. 4, para. 9.
107 See Kitt, supra note 11, at 495; Basel Convention, supra note 13, at pmbl., art. 4, para. 2.
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technologies and methods that meet international standards for the
management and disposal of the wastes.108
Transboundary movements of hazardous wastes that are not
prohibited under the Convention’s basic obligations still must meet the
requirements of prior notification and informed consent.109 Essentially,
before any waste shipment is made, notification must be given to transit
and importing countries; this notification must include all the information
specified under Annex V(A) of the Convention and clearly indicate the
effects of the proposed movement on human health, the environment, and
the States of transit.110 Additionally, in response to this notification require-
ment, transit and importing countries must give their written consent to
the shipment before the movement of the waste takes place; written con-
sent is assumed for transit States if the written requirement is expressly
waived.111 If this prior informed consent is not received by the exporting
county from each State involved, the transboundary movement is consid-
ered illegal under the Basel Convention.112 Parties are also required to re-
import wastes from a receiving country in instances of illegal traffic.113
3. Party to Non-Party Ban
Even though the Basel Convention generally prohibits Parties
from exporting or importing hazardous or other wastes with non-Parties,
this is only a limited ban.114 The Convention allows such movements to
be authorized for countries that have entered into bilateral, multilateral,
or regional agreements for waste treatment or disposal that provide no less
environmental protection than the Basel Convention itself.115 Similarly,
agreements that predate the Basel Convention may be continued if they
are compatible with the provisions of the Basel Convention; however, if
108 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 4, paras. 2, 7. The international standards
are to be set by the Conferences of the Parties, which adopt the appropriate technical
guidelines for each waste stream. Id. at art. 4, para. 8, and art. 15, para. 5.
109 See id. at art. 4, paras. 2, 7, & art. 6.
110 Id. at art. 4, para. 2 & art. 6, annex V(A); see also Jurdi, supra note 24, at 10.
111 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 6, paras. 3–4.
112 See id. at art. 9; see also Kitt, supra note 11, at 496–97.
113 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 8 & art. 9, para. 2; see also discussion
infra Part II.B.5.
114 The general prohibition is in the Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 4, para. 5.
However, the Convention allows for entry into agreements with non-Parties for the import
and export of covered wastes. Id. at art. 11.
115 Id. at art. 11. The agreements must “not derogate from the environmentally sound
management of hazardous waste” set out by the Basel Convention. Id.
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an agreement is concluded after May 5, 1992, the agreement must not
derogate from the environmental standard laid out by the Convention.116
4. Waste Minimization and Waste Management
Another, less discussed goal of the Basel Convention is to minimize
the amount of wastes produced and globally promote the proper manage-
ment of wastes.117 As one of the primary causes of toxic waste colonialism,118
it is easy to see why reduction of waste generation was incorporated into
the provisions of the Basel Convention. Several articles directly address
this goal and include pledges of the Parties to minimize the generation of
hazardous waste, establish proper domestic disposal facilities within their
borders, and minimize transboundary shipments of hazardous waste.119
Along these same lines, the Convention tries to encourage international
cooperation to achieve these goals, considering the technological, social,
and economic factors that could affect Parties’ methods of achieving waste
minimization and proper waste management.120 The Convention encour-
ages countries to cooperate and offer technological transfer and assis-
tance for developing countries that do not have the resources to dispose
of hazardous wastes properly.121
5. Illegal Trafficking
To directly address issues involving illegal or fraudulent trans-
boundary movements of hazardous waste, especially those to developing
countries, the Basel Convention adopted specific provisions regarding
116 Id. at art. 11. The derogation standard is higher than the compatibility standard. Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102nd Cong. 47–48.
117 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at pmbl. “Aware of the need to continue the devel-
opment and implementation of environmentally sound low-waste technologies, recycling
options, good house-keeping and management systems with a view to reducing to a mini-
mum the generation of hazardous wastes and other wastes.” Id.
118 See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of the increase in the global production of hazardous
wastes and the concomitant externalities that this generates.
119 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, art. 4, para. 2, & art. 10.
120 See id. art. 4, para. 2(a); see also Kitt, supra note 11, at 497.
121 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, art. 10, para. 2(d) (“Co-operate actively, subject
to their national laws, regulations and policies, in the transfer of technology and manage-
ment systems related to the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes and
other wastes. They shall also co-operate in developing the technical capacity among Parties,
especially those which may need and request technical assistance in the field.”).
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illegal trafficking.122 Any transboundary movement of hazardous waste
made without the prior informed consent of the importing or transit coun-
tries or made with consent obtained “through falsification, misrepresenta-
tion, or fraud” is considered illegal trafficking.123 Similarly, any deliberate
disposal of waste made in contravention of the Basel Convention or of in-
ternational customary law is also considered illegal trafficking.124 Even
though such transfers garner the label of illegal, the Convention does not
provide any enforcement provisions for illegal trafficking, and instead re-
quires Parties to adopt domestic legislation for the prevention and punish-
ment of these activities.125 There is no requirement for state action or
omission in these provisions, so a Party must take direct responsibility for
the illegal actions of their citizens in these situations.126 Usually, this in-
volves either ensuring the illegal waste is disposed in an environmentally
sound manner or retrieving an illegal shipment which originated in the
Party’s country.127
C. Amendments and Other International Agreements128
The Basel Convention was only the first step towards the global
management of transboundary hazardous waste. Subsequent implemen-
tation issues, amendments, and other international agreements have also
shaped the current framework for the global management of hazardous
waste.
1. The Basel Ban Amendment
Because toxic waste colonialism sparked most of the initial inter-
national negotiations, a total ban on the movements of hazardous waste
between developed and non-developed countries has been of constant
122 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 4, para. 2, art. 9 & art. 12.
123 See id. art. 9, para. 1.
124 Id.
125 See id. art. 9, para. 5.
126 See id. art. 9, paras. 2, 3.
127 See id. art. 8 & art. 9, paras. 2, 3.
128 This section covers some of the more well-known agreements regarding implemen-
tation, amendments, or other international agreements governing the transboundary move-
ments of hazardous waste. Even though they are not discussed in this paper, there are
a number of bilateral agreements usually made between neighboring states and several
regional agreements, such as the Barcelona Convention and the Waigani Convention.
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS AND WASTES
AND CONVENTIONS 4 (2002), available at http://www.basel.int/pub/threeConventions.pdf.
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debate in subsequent conferences and decisions. The Basel Convention
did not initially establish a total ban, but instead it adopted a compromise,
settling on a prior informed consent requirement and tabling the option
of a total ban for future conferences of the Parties (“COPs”).129 Several
attempts were made at early COPs requesting such movements to be abso-
lutely prohibited, but these requests fell short of the goal.130 The 1995 COP
decided that a total ban, based not upon the OECD/non-OECD distinctions
of previous COPs but rather an explicit listing of the countries, should be
developed as an amendment to the Basel Convention to give it greater legal
standing.131 Known as the “Basel Ban Amendment,” the new Article 4A
would prohibit all exports of wastes between developed and non-developed
countries if ratified.132 The amendment is still viewed as highly contro-
versial; proponents argue that the strict ban would eliminate toxic waste
colonialism,133 but opponents of the ban argue it acts as a disincentive for
fair trade and sound methods of recycling and reclamation.134 The Ban
Amendment needs sixty-two ratifications, representing three-fourths of
the Parties present at the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties,
to come into effect, and to date, sixty-three have officially ratified the
Amendment.135 However, because of the harsh controversy regarding the
Ban Amendment, its entry into force is still questionable at this time.136
2. Protocol on Liability and Compensation
The Basel Convention required that the Parties create and adopt
a protocol on liability.137 On December 10, 1999, after more than six years
129 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 963.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See Decision III/1 Amendment to the Basel Convention, Third Meeting of the Conference
of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Shipments of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Sept. 18–22, 1995, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.3/35,
available at http://cop8.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop1-4/cop3dece.pdf. The Basel Ban Amend-
ment was passed by a consensus of the eighty-two Parties present at the Third Meeting of
the Conference of the Parties of the Basel Convention (“COP-3”) on September 22, 1995,
and the decision established a new Article 4A and Annex VII to the Basel Convention. Id.
133 See Rebecca A. Kirby, Note, The Basel Convention and the Need for United States
Implementation, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 281, 296 (1994).
134 See id.
135 See Ban Ratification Deposit Box, BASEL ACTION NETWORK, http://www.ban.org/Deposit
_Box.html (last updated June 20, 2010). Seventy-one countries in total have actually
implemented or ratified the ban. Id.
136 Id.
137 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, art. 12; see also Basel Protocol on Liability and
Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
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of heated negotiations, 115 nations endorsed the Protocol on Liability and
Compensation.138 This protocol is designed to assign appropriate liability
procedures when the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes re-
sult in damages to human health and the environment.139 Essentially, the
Protocol establishes guidelines for both strict and fault-based liability.140
The Protocol imposes strict liability for damages in situations involving
Parties to the Basel Convention, but only while they maintain control of
the hazardous waste through their respective notifying, transporting, or
disposing entities.141 In efforts to extend the reach of the Protocol, any
person can be subject to fault-based liability under the general principals
of tort law, and compliance with the provisions of the Basel Convention
is a foundational duty of persons transporting hazardous waste between
countries.142 Furthermore, the Protocol imposes financial minimums on
damages to further protect claimants, leaving it up to individual nations
to impose domestic caps on liability.143 In order to ensure adequate mone-
tary coverage in potential liability situations, Parties must also carry some
form of financial guarantee.144 Unlike its predecessors, the Protocol appro-
priately assigns liability and provides compensation for damages to human
health and the environment resulting from the transboundary movements
of hazardous waste, and as such, it is heralded as a breakthrough in inter-
national environmental law.145 However, as of August 2010, only thirteen
countries had signed the Protocol, and only ten countries are considered
Parties to it.146 The Protocol’s entry into force is pending upon the ratifi-
cation of the agreement by twenty Parties.147
and their Disposal (Dec. 10, 1999), http://www.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop5/docs/prot-e.pdf
[hereinafter Basel Protocol].
138 Press Release, Daniel Pruzin, Hazardous Waste Agreement on Liability Protocol
Reached at Basel Conference of Parties (Dec. 10, 1999), available at http://www.ban.org/
ban_news/hazardous3.html. The Protocol, which is a very crucial enforcement mechanism,
will enter into force when twenty countries ratify its provisions. Id.
139 See id.
140 Id.
141 Choksi, supra note 89, at 522–23; see also Basel Protocol, supra note 137, art. 4.
142 Choksi, supra note 89, at 523; Basel Protocol, supra note 137, art. 5.
143 See Basel Protocol, supra note 137, art. 5, annex B; see also Choksi, supra note 89, at 523.
144 Basel Protocol, supra note 137, art. 14.
145 Choksi, supra note 89, at 522.
146 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, BASEL CONVENTION (Dec. 10, 1999),
http://www.basel.int/ratif/protocol.htm.
147 Id. Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Luxembourg,
Monaco, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are all Signatories the Basel Protocol.
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3. The Bamako Convention
Dissatisfied with the results of the Basel Convention, some develop-
ing nations in Africa met in 1991 to develop a regional ban on the import
of hazardous waste into their countries.148 The Organization of African
Unity (“OAU”) convened at The Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import
into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management
of Hazardous Wastes within Africa,149 and all fifty-three members signed
Bamako, which was entered into force on April 22, 1998.150 As a departure
from the Basel Convention, Bamako essentially bans the import of all haz-
ardous waste generated outside of the OAU for disposal or recycling and
deems any import from a non-Party to be an illegal act.151 Bamako allows
bilateral and multilateral agreements among Parties and non-Parties, but
these are limited to waste produced within Africa.152 The scope of Bamako
is also much broader than that of the Basel Convention; Bamako includes
any wastes outlawed in the exporting country and radioactive wastes, but
not waste derived from ship operations.153 Bamako requires Parties to
develop domestic means of regulation and enforcement and establish a
liability system for possible damages.154 Despite these strong provisions
and political support, Bamako countries simply lacked the capacity to
effectively implement the provisions and domestically prevent toxic waste
colonialism within their borders; as a result, the application of Bamako
became quite limited.155
Id. See also Ivorian Toxic Waste Dumps, supra note 37. In fact, after the Côte d’Ivoire
toxic waste dump, the executive secretary of the Basel Convention, Sachiko Kuwabara-
Yamamoto, actually professed, “we have a serious problem with enforcement,” and urged
Basel signatories to ratify the Protocol to help with these issues. Id.
148 See Kitt, supra note 11, at 500–01.
149 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-
boundary Movement of Hazardous Waste within Africa, opened for signature Jan. 30,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 [hereinafter Bamako].
150 African Union, List of Countries which Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Bamako Con-
vention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement
of Hazardous Waste within Africa, AFRICAN UNION, available at http://www.africa-union
.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Bamako%20Convention.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
151 Bamako, supra note 149, at art. 4, para.1.
152 See id. at art. 11, para. 1.
153 See id. at art. 2, paras. 1(d), 2, 3.
154 See id. at art. 4, para 3.
155 See Kitt, supra note 11, at 501.
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4. Lomé IV Convention and Cotonou Agreement
Shortly before the Bamako Convention, the African, Caribbean and
Pacific States (“ACP”) signed the Lomé IV Convention with the European
Economic Community.156 The Lomé IV Convention actually interacts with
the Basel Convention and is considered a supplement to it, prohibiting
the export of hazardous wastes from the European Community to ACP
States.157 The ACP States, in return for this concession, agreed not to
accept waste import from any other State outside the European Commu-
nity.158 The agreement also contains a chapter specifically on protection
of the environment and conservation of natural resources.159 The agree-
ment uses strong language to condemn international corporations involved
in hazardous waste dumping activities in Africa; furthermore, these
actions are even labeled as criminal, and the agreement demands prompt
remediation of contaminated areas.160 This agreement essentially elimi-
nates European shipments to developing ACP states without placing the
European Community at a competitive disadvantage.161 The Lomé IV
Convention expired in February 2000, and the European Community
and seventy-nine ACP countries entered into a new treaty known as the
Cotonou Agreement.162 Cotonou actually departs from the hazardous
waste trade ban and instead encourages “[c]ooperation on environmental
protection and sustainable utilisation and management of natural re-
sources . . . [t]aking into account issues relating to the transport and
156 The Fourth African, Caribbean, and Pacific States-European Economic Community
Convention of Lomé, opened for signature March 22, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 783 [hereinafter
Lomé IV Convention].
157 See KATHARINA KUMMER, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES
111–12 (1995).
158 Lomé IV Convention, supra note 156, at art. 39, para. 1; see also Hugh J. Marbury,
Hazardous Waste Exportation: The Global Manifestation of Environmental Racism, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 251, 267 (1995).
159 Lomé IV Convention, supra note 156, at pt. II, title I.
160 Rozelia S. Park, Note, An Examination of International Environmental Racism Through
the Lens of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
659, 694 (1998).
161 See, e.g., David J. Abrams, Note, Regulating the International Hazardous Waste Trade:
A Proposed Global Solution, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 840 (1990).
162 About the ACP Group, THE SECRETARIAT OF THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC
GROUP OF STATES, http://www.acpsec.org/en/about_us.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011); see
generally Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and its Member
States, of the Other Part, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3 [hereinafter ACP-EC Partnership Agreement].
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disposal of hazardous wastes.”163 Without the total ban, the agreement is
considered much weaker; still, Cotonou recognizes the existence of dis-
proportionate risks in developing countries and desires to protect against
inappropriate hazardous waste shipments to these countries.164
III. THE REEVALUATION
The current international agreements, both the widespread, legally
binding agreements and the ad hoc agendas among smaller groups of
countries, have not been as successful at eliminating toxic waste colonial-
ism as proponents would have hoped.165 Some are hoping that once the
stronger agreements, such as the Basel Ban, are entered into legal force,
the flow of toxic waste colonialism will not only be slowed but also eradi-
cated.166 However, such ratification seems unlikely due to continued oppo-
sition.167 This opposition to the current system of global hazardous waste
management seems to indicate the system may not be the most effective
means of global regulation.168 Because several years have passed since
the first steps towards a global management system were attempted, a
reevaluation analyzing the loopholes in the current system and possible
recommendations for future improvement are necessary.
A. What Are the Loopholes in the Current System?
Even though the dangers associated with improper disposal of haz-
ardous waste are obvious in both developed and developing countries, the
international regulations currently in place do not adequately address
issues associated with toxic waste colonialism. The international laws de-
signed to protect against reckless, transboundary disposal of hazardous
wastes tout high ideals and goals, but most of the goals are never attained
163 ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, supra note 162, at art. 32, para. 1.
164 See id. at title I, art. II.
165 See Mastny & French, supra note 43.
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 For example, the most recent Basel hazardous waste conference, held in Bali, Indonesia
in 2008 discussed how to manage the transboundary traffic of hazardous waste, despite
the many agreements since 1992 trying to do just that. This conference focused on the
importance of health and waste management for global development strategies such as
reducing poverty. Hazardous Waste Conference Opens in Bali, THAINDIAN NEWS (June 23,
2008, 9:00:26 AM), available at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/enviornment
/hazardous-waste-conference-opens-in-bali_10063459.html [hereinafter Basel in Bali].
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and improper disposals continue.169 Furthermore, even though a preven-
tative framework is desired, most widespread agreements are shrouded
by controversy.170 Such discrepancies beg to be addressed. Clearly articu-
lating the loopholes in the current global management system for haz-
ardous waste hopefully can help the international community reach better
solutions in the future.
1. Fraudulent Concealment and Illegal Shipments
Even though illegal dumping and under-the-table waste disposal
contracts are no longer as prevalent in the hazardous waste market, the
fraudulent concealment of hazardous waste shipments either by the gen-
erator, carrier, or receiver of the hazardous waste continues to be a loop-
hole in the system.171 The Basel Convention and other agreements do not
wipe out the illegal waste trade.172 Oftentimes, hazardous waste is simply
moved under false permits, bribes, improper labels, or even the pretext
of “recycling,” which is a growing trend.173
Efforts to combat fraudulent concealment of such shipments have
not been very successful. As the subsequent agreements to the Basel
Convention have shown, “broadening the definition of what constitutes
‘illegal’ waste trade will not make it any easier for the international com-
munity to monitor or control illegal transboundary movements” of hazard-
ous waste that violate these provisions.174 Most of the shipments flagged
as examples of toxic waste colonialism would be deemed “illegal” under the
Convention, but such a label does not make the shipments any easier to
eliminate.175 Furthermore, many countries lack any legislative means for
preventing and punishing such illegal activities, and the absence of co-
ordinated global methods of enforcement only exacerbate the futility of
domestic efforts to control the illegal trade of hazardous waste, due to the
disparity between enforcement resources and regulation uniformity.176




173 Id. Mastny and French point out that no port in the world can check every trans-
boundary shipment; such inspections are even less likely in developing countries. Id.
174 Montgomery, supra note 44, at 207.
175 Id. Montgomery compares the international transboundary movement of hazardous
waste to the United States illegal drug trade. “Despite their high moral tone, policies of
‘zero tolerance’ have not been at all effective in reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the
United States.” Id.
176 See Mastny & French, supra note 43, at 18–19.
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Unfortunately, under the current system, developing countries fall prey to
illegal activities more often than developed countries despite international
agreements designed to prevent such exchanges.177
2. Definitional Issues
One major issue with the Basel Convention is its failure to pro-
vide clear definitions regarding wastes. There are good arguments for and
against the use of broad definitions. Broad definitions prevent exporting
countries from simply classifying a waste as non-hazardous for transbound-
ary shipment to avoid international obligations, and they leave room for
the inclusion of wastes that may become hazardous if improperly managed
during disposal.178 However, many recyclable materials and non-hazardous
materials fall under the broad reach of the Basel Convention.179 Also, the
international laws fail to keep pace with changes in the waste disposal in-
dustry; more substances are being identified as possibly hazardous, but the
testing and listing of these wastes simply are not included in the laws.180
Similarly, vague definitions do not help countries implement the
international agreement. “The lack of distinction between ‘waste’ and
‘products’ in the convention and its vague criteria for ‘hazardous’ allowed
the continued export of hazardous waste” under the label of commodities
or raw materials, despite the fact that these wastes still present environ-
mental and health risks to developing countries.181 This discrepancy high-
lights conflicts that may occur when developing countries actually depend
on a viable recyclable commodity for economic growth; such recyclables are
a category of commodities that have yet to be clearly classified under the
Basel Convention Annexes.182 Vague definitions also allow countries to
develop their own categories and classifications; when the domestic cate-
gories do not agree, managing transboundary shipments becomes increas-
ingly difficult.183 Again, over-broad and ambiguous definitions appear to
only cause more problems with the international agreements, and the
177 Montgomery, supra note 44, at 199.
178 Kitt, supra note 11, at 494–95.
179 See id. at 495.
180 See Kate O’Neill, Out of the Backyard: The Problems of Hazardous Waste Management
at a Global Level, 7 J. ENV’T & DEV. 138, 143 (1998) (discussing the current difficulties in
establishing consistent waste identification and classification systems between nations).
181 Lipman, supra note 9, at 68–69.
182 See id.
183 See id. at 69.
608 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:581
foundational question regarding what should be regulated never seems
to be properly answered under the current system.
3. Issues with a Total Ban
Probably the most controversy surrounding the global management
of hazardous waste involves the debate regarding a total ban on trans-
boundary shipments between developing and developed countries. A total
ban on transboundary shipments between developing and developed coun-
tries sounds like the best way to eradicate toxic waste colonialism, but,
unfortunately, such a ban would only exacerbate issues of environmental
sustainability and disproportionate risks.184 A total ban would drastically
weaken recycling and reclamation operations which are performed correctly
and effectively185 These operations, by decreasing global waste quantities
and promoting the conservation of natural resources, promote environ-
mental sustainability more than hazardous waste landfill alternative.186
Even though “sham recycling” operations do exist, “legitimate recycling”
operations do not violate the objectives of the Basel Convention, and a
total ban would prohibit these activities from fully developing.187
Furthermore, a total ban unnecessarily and inappropriately labels
countries. Not all developing or “[n]on-OECD [c]ountries [a]re [a]like.”188
The label of “developing” “does not necessarily mean that the environment
or human health will be at risk” when it comes to the management of trans-
boundary hazardous waste.189 Several countries, such as Chile, Singapore,
and Brazil, have rising economies and recycling facilities at capacities
which can ensure the safety of recycling and reclamation operations.190
184 See Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Captain Planet Takes on Hazard Transfer: Combining
the Forces of Market, Legal and Ethical Decisionmaking to Reduce Toxic Exports, 27 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 71, 74–75, 75 n.17 (2009).
185 See Montgomery, supra note 44, at 210–11.
186 Id. at 210.
187 Id. at 211–12.
188 Id. at 213.
189 Id. at 212.
190 See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2010–2011, at 31,
50 (Klaus Schwab ed., 2010), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global
CompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf; Seng Eng Ong, RESEARCH CONSERVATION DEP’T,
SING. NAT’L ENV’T AGENCY, 3R PORTFOLIO—GOOD PRACTICES TO PROMOTE THE 3RS—
COUNTRY: SINGAPORE 1 (2005), http://www.env.go.jp/recycle/3r/en/info/05_13.pdf; Eva
Medalla, Recycla Reaches 4,000t/y Waste Separation Capacity, BUS. NEWS AMERICAS
(Aug. 9, 2010, 14:50 (GMT-0400)), http://www.bnamericas.com/news/waterandwaste
/Recycla_reaches_4,000t_y_waste_separation_capacity; Novelis to Expand Aluminum
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Interestingly enough, imposing a complete ban on countries such as
these “suggest[s] [a certain level of] paternalism” and “infringes on the
sovereign[ty]” of these nations to consent to the import of hazardous waste
for economic benefit.”191 There certainly is an interesting philosophical
issue between “banning hazardous waste exports that [may] cause harm”
to human health in a developing country and the possibility “that doing
so may endanger the [same people’s] very livelihood.”192
4. Cross-National Regulatory Differences
An interesting problem with the current international system is
that it leaves a majority of the implementation issues and enforcement
issues in the hands of individual governments; therefore, cross-national
regulatory differences often cause the international system to be under-
mined.193 As stated before, most countries characterize hazardous wastes
in radically different ways, and even though international environmental
law addresses the transboundary movements of hazardous waste, it does
little to establish an “international clearinghouse for information” regarding
the movements of wastes, countries of origins, ultimate destinations, and
treatment operations.194 Also, “there is a lack of fit between [the] domestic
and . . . international policy agendas in this area.”195 Most industrialized
nations have well-developed, domestic regulations in areas of hazardous
waste management, and “widening the scope of these regulations adds one
more task to already overburdened domestic agencies.”196 Problems can
also arise when countries that have a largely public-controlled hazardous
waste disposal industry attempt to transfer with countries that have pri-
vatized the waste disposal industry, as the regulations and governance of
the two systems are extremely different.197
Furthermore, the Basel Convention, while professing an interest
in decreasing waste generation and proper domestic waste management,
Recycling Capacity, COMMODITY ONLINE (May 21, 2010, 10:50:00), http://www.commodity
online.com/commodity-stocks/Novelis-to-expand-aluminium-recycling-capacity-2010-05
-21-28393-3-1.html.
191 See Lipman, supra note 9, at 71; see also Montgomery, supra note 44, at 217.
192 Lipman, supra note 9, at 71.
193 See O’Neill, supra note 180, at 142–43.
194 Id. at 143.
195 Id. at 143–44. O’Neill notes that “some of the most successful international environ-
mental agreements” were in areas that did not have much domestic legislation, such as
ozone layer protection or “the prevention of transboundary air pollution.” Id.
196 Id. at 144.
197 Id. at 148.
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downplays these activities in subsequent agreements.198 “[D]isposal of a
certain type of waste may be more ‘environmentally sound’ ” in another
country, and by limiting the movements of these wastes, domestic disposal
problems in certain countries continue.199 As developing countries experi-
ence economic growth, their hazardous waste generation will only increase,
and the international regulations do not address the need for these nations
to adopt sound hazardous waste management techniques before this hap-
pens.200 Some scholars have even suggested that by making exporting
countries responsible for their waste shipments, international regulations
actually decrease the responsibility of developing nations to ensure no
waste enters their borders and develop their own waste control laws.201
Even though the international regulations are meant to protect develop-
ing countries from toxic waste colonialism activities, they “may actually
retard . . . environmental awareness and responsibility” in the develop-
ment of domestic regulations in many countries.202
5. United States Ratification
As one of the largest global generators of hazardous wastes and a
major industrialized nation, the United States is a powerful force in the
global management of hazardous waste, but it has not yet ratified the
Basel Convention. Instead it exercises its option to enter into bilateral and
multilateral agreements with other parties.203 Even though the United
States was one of the first nations to adopt domestic legislation requiring
prior notice and consent for hazardous waste shipments, it has been slow
to adopt legislation showing intent to ratify the Basel Convention, an act
surrounded by heated controversy.204 Unknown to most, the United States
has domestic laws that require exporters of hazardous waste to notify
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) at least 60 days prior to
shipment.205 The EPA in turn gives notice to the importing and transit
198 Id. at 143.
199 See Kitt, supra note 11, at 508 (citation omitted).
200 See O’Neill, supra note 180, at 143.
201 See Montgomery, supra note 44, at 209.
202 Id.
203 See, e.g., Kirby, supra note 133, at 282 (noting that “[t]he United States was one of the
first signatories to the Basel Convention,” but it still has not become a party to the inter-
national agreement).
204 See Montgomery, supra note 44, at 210.
205 40 C.F.R. § 262.53 (2009); see also Jeffrey B. Gracer, Protecting Citizens of Other
Countries, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 777 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds.,
American Bar Association 2008).
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companies and requires written consent from the importing country be-
fore the shipment may occur, much like what is required under the Basel
Convention.206 Exporters of hazardous waste must also comply with domes-
tic regulations for manifests, exceptions, and annual reporting require-
ments.207 Furthermore, the EPA can impose a fine of up to $50,000 per
day for violations of these regulations or other international agreements
between the United States and an importing country.208 However, these
regulations do not give the EPA authority to stop shipments to consent-
ing countries, even if there is an indication the waste will not be disposed
of in an environmentally sound manner.209 The United States recognizes
the need for the global management of hazardous waste, but it questions
the implementation system of the international agreements. Full imple-
mentation of the Basel Convention would give the United States govern-
ment more power to control transboundary hazardous waste shipments
leaving its borders and would show the global community its support of
hazardous waste management efforts.210 There are also arguments that
ratification of the Basel Convention would increase international respect
for the United States and decrease the occurrences of toxic waste colonial-
ism.211 However, the government is often split on what enabling legislation
would look like for ratification, and problems with the Basel Ban Amend-
ment have delayed ratification even further.212 The lack of United States
ratification has had a strong negative impact on the effectiveness of the
current global system.213
B. Possible Recommendations
As with many international environmental issues, a quick-fix
solution to the problem of toxic waste colonialism is simply not possible.
206 See 40 CFR § 262.53(e), 262.52 (2009).
207 See 40 CFR § 262.54–56 (2009).
208 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(6) (2006).
209 See Gracer, supra note 205, at 777–78.
210 See Kirby, supra note 133, at 301.
211 See id. at 300–01, 301 n.85.
212 See Kitt, supra note 11, at 512–13 (discussing historical difficulties in passing ratifying
legislation in Congress; the Bush administration submitted a bill in the 1990s to implement
the Basel Convention that was never enacted, the Clinton administration also announced
principles for implementation and introduced a bill that never became law, and the most
recent Bush administration also failed to ratify the Basel Convention).
213 The United States is the largest producer of waste in the world; therefore, non-support
renders it a non-Party, causing other countries with which it is doing business to lack an
incentive, and perhaps have disincentives, to ratify the treaties themselves. See Choksi,
supra note 89, at 512, 515, 519.
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However, there is a growing interest in the pursuit of environmental jus-
tice,214 and by adjusting the focus of international negotiations, there might
be a way to address the loopholes in the current system and create a more
effective system for the global management of transboundary hazardous
waste in the future. In an effort to correct the problem of disproportionate
risks faced by developing countries, these recommendations mainly explore
possible changes in implementation and policy in the context of principles
of international environmental law.
1. Focus on Implementation
Many of the loopholes in the global management of hazardous
waste seem to be caused by implementation problems in international
agreements.215 Even though the Basel Convention presents lofty ideals
in its preamble about reducing hazardous waste generation, limiting trans-
boundary hazardous waste shipments, and promoting waste management
in an environmentally sound manner, the Convention fails to provide a
good framework for implementing these ideals.216
First of all, the foundational question of what exactly should be
regulated needs to be addressed. The problems associated with definitional
differences indicate that the international regulatory scheme needs to be
adjusted to account for the changes in the past twenty years. Not only do
the definitions regarding hazardous waste need to be clarified and nar-
rowed in scope to ease in implementation efforts and correct cross-national
regulatory differences, but some kind of mechanism needs to be in place
to determine future hazardous thresholds and materials.217 Even though
countries should be able to completely ban certain wastes under domestic
law, including the varied domestic definitions of hazardous wastes218 ap-
pears excessive and overbroad in the international context. Allowing these
substances to be handled under specific local law would promote a much-
needed consensus in the international system.
A portion of negotiations regarding the global management of haz-
ardous waste should be devoted to the areas of recycling and reclamation.
214 See O’Neill, supra note 180, at 149.
215 See Choksi, supra note 89, at 524–26 (listing a handful of the loopholes drawing criticism).
216 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at pmbl.
217 See Mastny & French, supra note 43. The growing issue of e-waste illustrates this need.
The Basel Convention did not foresee the problems associated with the transboundary ship-
ments of electronic materials, and thus the provisions simply do not provide a framework
for this growing problem. Id.
218 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 3.
2011] DECREASING DIRTY DUMPING? 613
However, such considerations are seemingly absent from the current
system. Proper recycling and reclamation of hazardous waste promotes
the principle of intergenerational equity, as it limits the disposal amounts
of hazardous waste and increases the sustainability of limited natural re-
sources.219 While legitimate recycling operations do not violate current in-
ternational agreements, these operations are not considered a valuable
alternative in the hazardous waste disposal system. Even in its provisions
seeking better domestic waste management practices, references to recy-
cling and reclamation options are surprisingly absent.220 The current agree-
ments actually prohibit the economic development and utilization of these
activities in the international arena.221 International standards could be
developed to allow these legitimate operations to continue and to eliminate
the possibility of illegitimate operations, especially in developing countries.
The current system does not allow developing nations to pursue these types
of activities as an alternative to landfill disposal, and it unnecessarily pre-
vents the possible export of hazardous waste from these developing states
to developed countries for recycling purposes.222 Additionally, a system that
embraces recycling and reclamation rather than just disposal could pos-
sibly encourage United States ratification, as this is a developing attitude
of United States’ industries.223
Even though the current system establishes an elaborate system
of duty to notify and prior informed consent, two very important interna-
tional environmental principles,224 the agreements do little to express
means of implementing these systems. Recognizing that countries have
differing levels of economic and social means of implementation, the prin-
ciple of “common but differentiated” responsibilities needs to be explored.225
Developing threshold requirements for enforcement of the implementation
provisions based upon a country’s government capabilities could be very
219 See Chris O’Brien, Global Manufacturing and the Sustainable Economy, 40 INT. J.
PROD. RES. 3867, 3867–69 (2002); see also United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992), available at http://
www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163.
Principle 3 states, “The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.” Id.
220 See Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 4, para. 2, art. 10.
221 See Choksi, supra note 89, at 536–37.
222 Id. at 536.
223 See id. at 535–37.
224 See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 219, at princ. 18–19.
225 See id. at princ. 7 (“In view of the different contributions to global environmental
degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities.”).
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beneficial. Providing the means for developing countries to protect them-
selves through proper enforcement can only help decrease issues of toxic
waste colonialism.226 Illegal dumping activities will continue in areas where
the national government can do nothing to stop them.227 Furthermore, even
though they may not have the same resources, developing countries still
have some duty to implement effective environmental laws.228 Even if this
duty is limited by economic and social costs, the international agreements
enacted need to provide some means of helping developing nations achieve
this principle.
Finally, where developing nations need to be held to some minimum
standard regarding implementation of effective environmental laws, de-
veloped countries need to focus on pollution prevention in areas of imple-
mentation. The principle of pollution prevention focuses on the need to
anticipate environmental harm and to act in ways that would avoid these
harms.229 This means developed countries need to seek out waste minimi-
zation plans, promote domestic recycling and reclamation operations, and
develop means for an overall reduction of hazardous waste in production.230
Currently, waste disposal facilities in developed countries are extremely
congested, and there are few attempts by private companies or national
agencies to enact new waste-reduction measures.231 The idea of waste mini-
mization, although a goal of the international agreements, is not wholly
pursued or developed in negotiations.232 If toxic waste colonialism is truly
going to be eradicated, the international pressure resulting from the
226 See Choksi, supra note 89, at 519; Kitt, supra note 11, at 511.
227 See Mastny & French, supra note 43.
228 See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 219, at princ. 11
(“States shall enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental standards, manage-
ment objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context
to which they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of un-
warranted economic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries.”).
229 See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 10, pt. I, princ. 6 (“The discharge of toxic sub-
stances or of other substances . . . in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the
capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must be halted in order to ensure
that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems.”).
230 See O’Neill, supra note 180, at 149 (discussing the new waste management systems
of Britain, France, Germany, and Australia to illustrate the importance of governments
in adopting strategies for hazardous waste management including “fiscal measures to
change the incentives for choosing certain disposal techniques, the reorganization of waste
regulation responsibilities, the development of waste minimization programs, and research
into new, and potentially greener, disposal technologies”).
231 Id. at 143, 145.
232 See Basel Convention, supra note 13; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
supra note 219; Stockholm Declaration, supra note 10.
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global increase of hazardous waste production must also be addressed.
The “midstream” regulation of the hazardous waste life cycle, controlling
transboundary shipments, does little to actually prevent pollution at the
outset and eliminate disposal problems like toxic waste colonialism.233
2. Focus on Policy
Other problems in the current global management system for haz-
ardous waste can be linked to the underlying policies that are not taking
priority in international discussions. Essentially, there are some princi-
ples of international law that provide a good course of action with regard
to this particular issue and should be pursued in the formation of future
international agreements. These policy recommendations should take a
more prominent role in future discussions on the global management of
hazardous waste.
First, the obligation not to cause environmental harm234 arguably
includes not only a State’s responsibility to those outside its jurisdiction,
but also to the substantial harm that might occur within its territory.235
Even though this principle overlaps and impedes on State sovereignty
rights, the ecological interdependence of all nations suggests that State
responsibility must include at least some obligation to promote environ-
mental protection and sustainable development while properly managing
environmental harm within State borders.236 In the discussion regarding
the transboundary movement of hazardous waste, the origins of the waste
seemingly have become more important than the management of the waste
itself.237 However, hazardous waste can be extremely harmful, regardless
of where it is produced and where it is disposed.238 As such, it should be ad-
dressed in the context of sustainable development and managed properly
233 See Choksi, supra note 89, at 520.
234 See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 10, princ. 21. See also Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, supra note 219, princ. 2.
235 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 506. This argument departs from the traditional
“do no harm” principle expressed in the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration.
See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 10, princ. 21; Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, supra note 219, princ. 2. It seems well-suited to the problems associated with
hazardous waste; in order for international agreements to be successful in this area, some
degree of State responsibility has to be allotted for environmental harm caused within State
jurisdiction. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 506.
236 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 506.
237 Montgomery, supra note 44, at 214–15.
238 See id. at 215.
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to “insure [sic] protection of human health and the environment.”239 As
the developing world experiences economic growth and subsequently con-
tinues to increase its production of hazardous waste, this principle needs
to provide a foundation for international agreements. Simply banning
transboundary shipments does not ensure hazardous waste is properly
managed in these regions. Rather than continually force unattainable envi-
ronmental regulations on these nations, it might prove a better foundation
to build on the provisions that empower these nations to assert their own
environmental standards. Future discussions on the global management
of hazardous waste need to focus on ways to enable developing nations
to prevent environmental harm, not only from outside their territories, but
also from harm created within their borders.240 Even though all States
carry this responsibility, the “do no harm” policy also implicates the impor-
tance of non-discrimination of environmental harms.241 States should not
shift the burden of environmental harms caused by their hazardous waste
to other States which may have little control in the country of origin.242 The
vulnerability of some countries to this type of exposure is apparent,243 and
in order to eliminate toxic waste colonialism, all aspects of the obligation
not to cause harm need to be addressed.
Probably the most under-utilized principle of international envi-
ronmental law applicable to this area is the right of public participa-
tion.244 Public participation, coupled with the related principles of access
to information and access to justice in environmental decision-making,
encourages public awareness and information sharing in order to achieve
239 Id. at 215. See Basel in Bali, supra note 168. It appears that this idea is becoming more
popular in the hazardous waste discussion: Indonesia’s Environment Minister Rachmat
Witoelar said the 2009 Basel Hazardous Waste Conference “will emphasize the strong and
mutually dependent relationship between environmentally sound waste management and
sustainable development.” Id. Witoelar also mentioned that “the Basel Convention [was]
meant to [address] . . . risks of the environmental degradation caused by transboundary
movement[s] of hazardous waste,” but also “it is a part of [a] larger framework for
ensuring environmental sustainability.” Id.
240 See Montgomery, supra note 44, at 215–16.
241 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 40, at 506; Stockholm Declaration, supra note 10, at
princ. 21; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 219, at princ. 2.
242 See Lipman, supra note 9, at 68–69, 71.
243 See id. at 67 (discussing examples of specific developing nations targeted for waste
disposal, and the attendant consequences of that disposal).
244 See, e.g., Stockholm Declaration, supra note 10, at rec. 97(1)(a); 42 U.S.C. § 6794(b)(1)
(“Public participation in the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of
any regulation, guideline, information, or program under this chapter shall be provided
for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the States.”).
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environmental protection and sustainable development at all levels—
local, regional, national, and international.245 There are at least three
different areas where public participation in the global management of
hazardous waste could be very beneficial, namely partnering between
States and private industries, cultural carry-over, and citizen complaints
and tort remedies.
By partnering with the private waste industry, States gain a valu-
able advantage in addressing transboundary movements of hazardous
waste. These discussions promote a more positive connection between
public and private sectors, encouraging information sharing and develop-
ing a more complete view of the environmental and economic issues sur-
rounding hazardous waste management.246 Additionally, the persistent
occurrence of disastrous hazardous waste releases has led to a surprising
increase in voluntary programs focused on “corporate environmental re-
sponsibility.”247 Along these same lines, corporations are more sensitive
to allegations of human rights violations and transboundary harm, and
these concerns form the foundation for project design and policy imple-
mentation worldwide.248 Many private corporations, at least in the United
States, have recognized these management issues and many have sought
to avoid tortious liability and environmental justice violations by imple-
menting personal safeguards for international shipments, despite the
shortcomings or total lack of domestic regulations.249 Even though many
of these corporate responses have been voluntary, some of the ways States
can promote such voluntary responses are by providing fiscal incentives for
activities that promote proper disposal operations, by reorganizing admin-
istrative agencies to promote a closer relationship between the government
and private waste industries, by developing new disposal techniques, or by
simply developing effective waste minimization policies.250 Promoting such
partnering techniques between States and private industry increases the
chances of public participation in the hazardous waste problem.
245 See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 10, at pt. I, 7, rec. 97(1)(a).
246 O’Neill, supra note 180, at 156.
247 Gracer, supra note 205, at 784.
248 See id. at 785. According to Gracer, these new corporate policies include several com-
ponents including, “aggressive outreach to affected communities, increased opportunities
for consultation during project planning, creation of an appropriate infrastructure to
support the project, ongoing monitoring of project commitments, and public reporting of
monitoring results.” Id.
249 See id. at 784–85.
250 See generally O’Neill, supra note 180, at 150–55 (discussing strategies used by Britain,
France, Germany, and Australia that have implications for international waste regulation).
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Another area of public participation that is under-utilized in
the global management of hazardous waste is cultural carry-over and
technological exchange. The Basel Convention included provisions that
encouraged the transfer of technology for hazardous waste management
purposes.251 However, very few of these exchanges have taken place, de-
spite the fact that “much of the technology . . . is portable.”252 Providing in-
ternational investment and technology exchange for environmentally safe
recycling and disposal methods for developing countries can help alleviate
the economic pressures to accept foreign hazardous waste and promote
proper internal environmental standards.253 Allowing foreign exporters
to implement disposal technologies that “adhere to global environmental
standards” in developing countries can “upgrade [the] environmental
performance” of hazardous waste disposal.254 Furthermore, there is high
potential for profits for companies that perform these exchanges.255 This
act of public participation is especially crucial in countries with rising
economies and disposal capacities.
Currently, it appears that fears of toxic waste colonialism have
overshadowed the possibility of equipping developing nations with proper
disposal options from the outset. International environmental policies
should pursue means to achieve these technological transfers.
Finally, adopting policies that provide for citizen complaints and
tort remedies in areas of transboundary movements of hazardous waste
can also be a beneficial means of addressing problems with toxic waste
colonialism and encourage public participation.256 Currently, the World
Bank, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation have systems in place for accepting citizen
complaints regarding projects financed through these companies.257 Even
though these environmental review systems are considered a major ad-
vance in areas of public participation and are designed to promote environ-
mentally responsible projects, such actions are shrouded with controversy
and questions of effectiveness.258 Furthermore, these environmental review
251 Basel Convention, supra note 13, art. 10, para. 2(d).
252 O’Neill, supra note 180, at 156.
253 See Lipman, supra note 9, at 71.
254 Id.
255 O’Neill, supra note 180, at 156.
256 See Noah Sachs, Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in Inter-
national Environmental Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 838, 844–45; Stockholm Declaration,
supra note 10, at princ. 22.
257 See Gracer, supra note 205, at 780–84.
258 Id. at 781–84.
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systems only apply to projects funded by the organizations. The interna-
tional community should consider enacting such a review system for the
transboundary movements of hazardous waste as well. Not only would such
provisions empower the local people, who are most likely to be affected by
shipments, to respond, but these types of actions put an increased pres-
sure on both the importing and exporting governments to respond to the
concerns of their citizens.
Furthermore, expanding the opportunity for civil recourse might
also encourage public participation in this area. Tort law not only serves
as a preventative measure by discouraging possible unlawful conduct but
also can be developed as a “regulatory mechanism [or] compensatory func-
tion.”259 In situations involving toxic waste colonialism, all three of these
results of tort law could be beneficial; however, most efforts in this area are
mainly concentrated selectively in the United States.260 Exploring other
means of holding multinational corporations responsible for tortious acts
under international agreements might prove to be a valuable tool in pre-
venting, regulating, and compensating for toxic waste colonialism activities.
CONCLUSION
Approximately twenty years have passed since the major interna-
tional agreement in this area, the Basel Convention, was developed by
the international community. However, toxic waste colonialism is still a
confounding problem which limits the success of the global system for the
management of transboundary hazardous waste. Admittedly, the Basel
Convention provides a much needed foundation in this arena, but the
problem of disproportionate risks still persists in current implementation
and policy efforts. The global management of hazardous waste needs to
be reevaluated and adjusted to better address these issues.
Toxic waste colonialism represents an activity where the hazard-
ous waste pollution from developed countries is exported to developing
states as an inexpensive alternative for disposal. Because of the lack of
technology, capacity, training, funding, or administrative infrastructure
259 Nicola M.C.P. Jägers & Marie-José van der Heijden, Corporate Human Rights
Violations: The Feasibility of Civil Recourse in the Netherlands, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 833,
836 (2008).
260 See id.; see also Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The United States has
enacted the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), a unique legislative measure that allows
individuals and corporations, regardless of their location, to be held responsible in the
United States for violations of international law. Id.
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in developing nations, the opportunity for human exposure in a developing
nation is much greater than in a developed nation. Also, many of these
nations simply do not have the resources to treat the resulting harms of
toxic waste colonialism.261 There are two main causes of the prevalence
of toxic waste colonialism, namely the global increase of hazardous waste
production and harsh economic pressures.262 Toxic waste colonialism
should garner the attention of the international community due to the
increased likelihood of harm to human health and the environment and
these exacerbating underlying causes.
The international response to the transboundary movement of haz-
ardous waste includes several agreements. In the late 1970s, the domestic
legislation in the United States and the European Community laid the
foundation for broader international agreements. The Basel Convention
is considered the most far-reaching international agreement establishing
a global notification and consent system for the transboundary movement
of hazardous waste and prohibiting the trade of covered wastes.263 Even
though they are the primary source of controversy, the subsequent amend-
ments and other ad hoc agreements, including the Basel Ban Amendment,
the Protocol on Liability and Compensation, the Bamako Convention, and
the Lomé IV Convention and Cotonou Agreement, have widened the scope
and application of the Basel Convention.264
Even with all these agreements covering the transboundary move-
ments of hazardous wastes, there are still loopholes in the current system
that allow problems associated with toxic waste colonialism to continue.
First, illegal hazardous waste shipments continue to be a loophole in the
system, and broadening the scope of international agreements to include
more “illegal” transactions have not made it any easier to monitor or con-
trol movements of transboundary hazardous waste that violate these pro-
visions.265 Second, even though there are good arguments for the broad
definitions regarding hazardous wastes in international provisions, the
international laws have failed to keep pace with the changes in the waste
disposal industry, and the vague definitions only perpetuate problems with
implementation.266 Definitions in the international agreements do not ade-
quately address recycling or reclamation usage of hazardous waste either.
261 See discussion supra Part I; see also Ivorian Toxic Waste Dumps, supra note 37.
262 See discussion supra Part I.B.
263 Basel Convention, supra note 13, at art. 4, para. C.; see Lipman, supra note 9, at 68.
264 See discussion supra Part II.C.
265 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
266 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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Third, the debates over a total ban on transboundary shipments between
developing and developed countries have revealed an interesting philo-
sophical problem.267 Even though this ban sounds like the best way to eradi-
cate toxic waste colonialism, a complete ban on transboundary hazardous
waste movements that may cause harm may also unnecessarily result in
the destruction of the livelihood of the very same people it is trying to
protect.268 Labeling countries for the purposes of the ban does not neces-
sarily promote environmental sustainability or the protection of human
health and the environment.269 Fourth, because most implementation and
enforcement of international agreements in these areas are left to domestic
legislation, cross-national regulatory differences also are a loophole in the
current system.270 There is no international compilation of information
regarding the movements of wastes, countries of origins, ultimate desti-
nations, and treatment operations. Furthermore, the differing environ-
mental policies of nations have resulted in a retardation of environmental
awareness and responsibility in some countries and the development of
over-burdening domestic laws in others. Unfortunately, these differences
cause substantial problems with international implementation. Finally,
the lack of United States ratification of the international agreements has
continued to be a controversial loophole in the current hazardous waste
management system.271 As a powerful, developed nation, the United
States’ support would only bolster efforts against toxic waste colonialism,
but disagreements in implementation procedures and questions regarding
the domestic enabling legislation have resulted in a continued lack of
support from the United States for the international system.
Once again, there is no quick solution to problems in this area. Most
international agreements take years to negotiate and even longer to go into
effect. However, as this article has recommended, by exploring possible
changes in implementation and policy, in the context of principles of in-
ternational environmental law, a future international agreement in this
area might be able to increase the effectiveness of the current system.272
The international community should focus on ways to correct im-
plementation issues and ways to promote proper implementation world-
wide. The foundational question of what exactly should be regulated needs
267 See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
268 Lipman, supra note 9, at 71.
269 See discussion supra Part III.A.2–3; see also Montgomery, supra note 44, at 212–13.
270 See discussion supra Part III.A.4.
271 See discussion supra Part III.A.5.
272 See discussion supra Part III.B.
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to be addressed. The problems associated with definitional differences in-
dicate that the international regulatory scheme needs to be adjusted to
account for the changes in the past twenty years and to address the areas
of recycling and reclamation.273 Also, developing possible threshold require-
ments for enforcement of the implementation provisions based upon a
country’s governmental capabilities could be very beneficial. Providing the
means for enabling developing countries to protect themselves through
proper enforcement can only help decrease issues of toxic waste colonialism,
and the international agreements enacted need to provide some means of
helping developing nations achieve this goal. Developed countries need to
anticipate environmental harm and focus on pollution prevention in areas
of implementation to prevent these harms because regulating the mid-
stream of the hazardous waste life cycle does little to eradicate toxic waste
colonialism altogether.
The other problems in the current global management system for
hazardous waste can be linked to the underlying policies that are not tak-
ing priority in international discussions. These policy recommendations
should take a more prominent role in future discussions on the global man-
agement of hazardous waste.274 Because hazardous waste can be extremely
harmful regardless of where it is produced and where it is disposed, it
should be addressed in the context of sustainable development and proper
management to ensure protection of human health and the environment.
Future discussions on the global management of hazardous waste need to
focus on ways to empower developing nations to prevent environmental
harm, not only from outside their territories but also from harm created
within their borders. Developed States’ focus should be to promote the im-
portance of non-discrimination of environmental harm and to avoid shift-
ing the burden of hazardous waste to countries that do not share in the
production benefits. The international environmental law principle of
public participation is also under-utilized in the global management of
hazardous waste. Partnering between States and private industries helps
generate a more complete view on the environment and cultivates a positive
relationship that can exist between environmental protection and economic
activity. Cultural carry-over between developed and developing countries
can help alleviate the economic pressures to accept foreign hazardous
waste, promote proper internal environmental standards, and upgrade the
environmental performance of hazardous waste disposal in developing
273 See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
274 See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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countries. Finally, adopting policies that provide for citizen complaints
and tort remedies would empower the local people, who are most likely
to be affected by hazardous shipments, to respond to this issue and would
pressure both the importing and exporting governments to respond to the
concerns of their citizens. These policies, possibly, could also prove to be
a valuable tool in preventing, regulating, and compensating for toxic waste
colonialism activities.
These recommendations only reflect upon a few of the possible
changes to the current focus of the international system. The law of envi-
ronmental justice calls for this area of international law to be more effec-
tively addressed. Hopefully, in the next twenty years, the international
community will have more success managing the global transboundary
movements of hazardous waste and preventing toxic waste colonialism.
